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Abstract 
Password-based group key agreement protocols are fundamental component of the communications systems. In 2009, Zheng et al. 
proposed an efficient and provably secure password-based agreement protocol and declared their protocol is secure in the ideal-
cipher and random oracle models under the DDH problem. In this paper, we propose an online dictionary attack against Zheng et 
al.’ protocol, which an adversary can test more than one password in a session. If the number of users is few, this attack can not lead 
to security problem. However, if many users participate in this protocol, the security problem can not be ignored.
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1. Introduction
Group key agreement protocols allow a group of users to agree on a session key and achieves 
implicit authentication, which simply ensures secrecy of session keys against an adversary passively 
eavesdropping. Authentication group key agreement protocols further allow these users to agree upon 
session key even in the presence of active adversaries. Since the first two-party key agreement protocol 
[1] was proposed by Diffie-Hellman in 1976, lots of papers [2,3,4,5] have extended this protocol to the 
group key cases. 
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Among these protocols, password is one of the ideal authentication approaches to agree a session 
key in the absence of PKI or pre-distributed symmetric keys. Since the password based authenticated key 
agreement protocols require users only to remember a human-memorable (low-entropy) password, this 
kind of protocols is widely used in many Internet systems, such as Kerberos and KryptoKnight. However, 
due to the low-entropy, the password-based group key agreements easily suffer from the dictionary 
attack.
Usually dictionary attacks are classified into two classes: online dictionary attacks and offline ones. 
In online dictionary attacks, an adversary usually attempts one guessed password a time by participating 
in a key agreement protocol. If the attempts failed, the adversary shall send another message to initiate a 
new session until he finds the correct password [6]. In offline dictionary attacks, an adversary selects a 
password form a dictionary and sends the corresponding message he generates with the password to other 
users. Then he repeats to guess all the possible passwords in his dictionary with the responded 
information. 
In 2009, Zheng et al. [7] proposed a provably secure password-based agreement protocol based on 
Horng’s group key agreement protocol [8] and prove that it is secure against the offline dictionary in the 
ideal-cipher and random oracle models under the DDH problem. In this paper, we present a new online 
dictionary attack against Zheng et al.’ protocol that an adversary can test more than one password in a 
session. If the number of users is very few, this attack can not lead to security problem. However, if many 
users participate in this protocol, the security problem can not be ignored.  
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Computational assumptions 
y Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem 
Let G be a finite cyclic group of prime order q. Given { , , , }x y xyreal g g g gΓ = and { , , , }x y zrand g g g gΓ = where
, , qx y z Z∈ , it is difficult to distinguish zg and xyg . Formally, if we define the advantage function 
where , we say that the DDH problem is hard in group 
G if is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary .
( )DDHGAdv
DDH
GAdv
| Pr[ ( ) 1] Pr[ ( ) 1] |X Y= = − =   
( ) 
,alX Yre∈Γ rand∈Γ
( )DDHGAdv t is the maximum 
value of running in time at most t. ( )DDHGAdv  
y Multi-Decisional Diffie-Hellman (MDDH) assumption 
Given and1 21{ ,{ } , }i nx x xreal i ng g g ⋅ ⋅ ⋅≤ ≤Π = K x 1{ ,{ } , }ix yrand i ng g g≤ ≤Π = where 1, , ,n qx x y Z∈K , it is difficult to distinguish 
and1 2x xg ⋅ ⋅K nx⋅ yg . Define the advantage function , where ,
the DDH problem is hard in group G if is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial time 
adversary .
( ) | [ ( ) 1] |Y Pr[ ( ) 1] PrX= = −  MDDHGAdv
( )MDDHGAdv
= ,real randX Y∈Γ ∈Γ
 ( )MDDHGAdv t is the maximum value of running in time at most t. ( )MDDHGAdv
2.2. Security model 
A protocol P for password-based group key agreement assumes that there is a 
set fo n users, who share a low-entropy secret password pw which is uniformly drawn 
from a small dictionary of size N. This security model allows concurrent execution of the protocol among 
n users, so each of users may have several instances called oracles involved in distinct ones. We denote 
the jth instance of by
1{ , , }nU U U= K
iU
j
iU . During the execution of the protocol, the adversary is given control over all 
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communication in the external network. The interaction between the adversary and users occur only via 
oracle queries, which model the adversary’ capabilities in a real attack. These queries are as follows: 
Send ( jiU , m): The adversary can carry out an active attack by this query. The output of the query is 
the response generated by the instance jiU upon receipt of message m according to the execution of the 
protocol P. The adversary is allowed to prompt the unused instance jiU to initiate the protocol by invoking 
Send ( jiU , start) 
Test ( jiU ): This query models the misuse of the session key by instance
j
iU . Once the 
instance jiU has accepted a session key, the adversary can attempt to distinguish it from a random key as 
the basis of determining security of the protocol. A random bit b is chosen; if b=0 then session key is 
returned while if b=1 then a random key is returned. The random keys must be consistent among users in 
the same session. Therefore, a random key is simulated by the evaluation of a random function on the 
view a user has of the session: all the participants have the same view, they thus have the same random 
key but independent of the actual view. 
Finally adversary outputs a guess bit . Such an adversary is said to win the game if where b 
is the hidden bit used by the Test oracle.  
'b 'b b=
In the ROR model, Execute, Send and Test queries can be asked by the adversary. Execute queries 
were introduced to model passive attack. However, they can easily be simulated using the Send and 
queries. 
2.3. Review of Horng’s protocol 
In 2001, Horng [8] proposed an efficient GKA protocol based on BD protocol [9]. Horng indicated 
that the protocol is secure against passive attack under the DDH assumption. It proceeds as follows. 
Step1. Initially, each user choosesiU i qx Z∈ , computes and broadcasts mod p. ixiy g=
Step2. After receiving all , computes mod p. Note 
the chooses
(1 , )jy j n j≤ ≤ ≠ i (1 )iU i n< < 1 1( i
x
i i iz y y− +≡ ⋅ )
1U 1 qR G∈ and computes mod p, and chooses11 1 2xz R y≡ ⋅ nU n qR G∈ and computes mod p. 
Then, broadcasts .
1
nx
n n nz R y −≡ ⋅
(1iU i< < )n iz
Step3. After receiving all , computes the session key as (1 , )jz j n j≤ ≤ ≠ i iU
{ 1 /2 11 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 11 2 ( 1)/2
1 21
       mod            
( )  mod          
mod 
n
i i n n
n
ii
g z p if n is even x x x x x x
i g z p if n is odd
K g p
− −
= + −
− −
=
Π − + + +
Π
≡ ≡
K
where mod p. Therefore, if1 211 x xg g −− ≡ 11g − is known, session key iK is easy to compute. The computation 
of 11g − is different for each user: 
1U computes 111 2 xg g −− ≡ mod p. computes2U 211 1 xg g −− ≡ mod p. computes3U 311 2x 2g y z− = mod p. 
(4 )iU i n≤ ≤ computes 11g − { ( 2) 2 ( 2) 22 1 21 1 1( 3) 2 ( 1) 2
2 1 21 1 1
( ) ( )  mod            
( ) ( )   mod           
xi ii
j jj i j
x i ii
j ji j j
z y z p if i is even
y z z p if i is odd
− −
+= − =
− −
+− = =
Π Π
Π Π
≡
3. Review of Zheng et al.’s protocol 
In this protocol, the following notations are used throughout Zheng et al.’s protocol: 
q: a secure large prime. 
p: a large prime such that p=2q+1. 
G: a subgroup of quadratic residues in *pZ , that is 
2 *{ | }pG i i Z= ∈
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g: a generator for the subgroup G. 
k , : of an ideal-cipher system, k is a bit key. k l 
*:{0,1} {0,1}l→   is a hash function for generating the symmetric key. 
*:{0,1} {0,1}l→    is a hash function for generating the session key. 
*:{0,1} {0,1}l→   is a hash function for key confirmations. 
Suppose n players share a low-entropy password pw which is uniformly drawn from a small 
dictionary of size N, and wish to agree a high-entropy common session key among themselves. Zheng et 
al.’s PGKA protocol is obtained by modifying the non-authenticated GKA protocol of Horng [] by using 
password encrypted authentication mechanism. The protocol was described as follows: 
Step1. Each player chooses a random nonce and broadcasts ( , . Upon receiving 
all
iU (1 )i n≤ ≤ iN )i iU N
( , )j jU N (1 , )i n j i≤ ≤ ≠ , sets session .iU {( , ), (1 )}i iS U N i n= ≤ ≤
Step2. Each player choosesiU i qx Z∈ , computes and broadcasts , where mod p, 
.
* ( )
ii k i
z z=  ixiz g≡
( , , )ik S i pw=  
Step3. Each player decrypts , , and computes left key ,
mod p, where
iU 1
*
1 1( )ii k iy z−− −=  1
*
1 1( )ii k iz z++ +=  1U 1 1
Lz R=
1
1 2
xRz z= 1R G∈
1
nx
n z −=
. computes left key mod p, right key 1 mod p. 
computes left key mod p, right key , where
iU
n
(1＜＜ )i n
R
nz =
1iz i
xL
iz −=
nR n
ixR
iz z += i
nU
Lz R G∈ . Then each player computes 
and broadcasts
iU (1 )i n≤ ≤
L R
i i ziX z= mod p. Notes that 1R Li iz z += .
Step4. Each player computes mod p exactly using the same approach in the Step3 
of Horng’s protocol then computes and broadcasts his key confirmation ,
where .
iU
}n≤
1 2 2 3 1n nx x x x x x
iK g −
− + + +
≡
K
( , , , )i iS i Kα=  
*{( , ) |1j jz z jα = ≤
Step5. After receiving and checking all key confirmations, player computes session key as iU
( , , )i isk G S Kβ= , .*{( , , )1 }j j jz z j nβ = ≤ ≤
k
4. Cryptanalysis of Zheng et al.’s protocol 
First, the adversary starts a session in which all the honest players have indices of the form 3(
for . The adversary plays the role of player and 3( . There are 3k players in all. 
Then, let 
1) 2i − +
1, ,i = K 3( 1) 1i − + 1) 3i − +
1{ , , }mpw pwK be a list of candidate passwords that an adversary wants to try. The adversary gets 
out k candidate passwords to test in this message. 
1. He chooses 2k random nonce and computes .{( , ), (1 3 )}i iS U N i k= ≤ ≤
2. He chooses 2k random numbers 1 3 3( 1) 1 3( 1) 3, , , ,k k qx x x x Z− + − + ∈K
( ,3( 1) 1, )i ik S i pw= − + 3( 1) 3− +
, computes the corresponding mod 
p, computes , where and , , and 
broadcasts .
ix
iz g≡
k* ( )
ii k i
z =  
*
i
z
)
3( 1) 1− +  ( ,3( 1) 3, )i ik S i= − + pw 1, ,i = K
z
3. He decrypts and with the guessed
3( 1) 1
*
3( 1) 1 3( 1) 1( )ii k iz z− +− + − +=  3( 1) 3
*
3( 1) 3 3( 1) 3(ii k iz z− +− + − +=  ipw ,
computes , , and checks whether . Therefore, the Adversary 
can erase k candidate passwords from the list with one message. 
3(
3( 1) 1 3(
xR
i iz z− + ≡ 1) 11) 2i− +− + 3( 1) 33( 1) 3 3( 1) 2i
xL
i iz z − +− + − +≡ 3( 1) 1z z− + 3( 1) 3 3( 1) 2
R L
i i iX− + − +⋅ =
5. The countermeasures 
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Step1. Each player chooses a random nonce and broadcasts ( , . Upon receiving 
all
iU (1 )i n≤ ≤ iN )i iU N
( , )j jU N (1 , )i n j i≤ ≤ ≠ , sets session .iU {( , ), (1 )}i iS U N i n= ≤ ≤
Step2. Each player choosesiU i qx Z∈ , computes and broadcasts , where mod p, 
.
* ( || )
ii k i i
z z k=  ixiz g≡
( , , )ik H S i pw=
Step3. Each player decrypts , , and checks whether 
and . If both the two equations hold, computes left key 
, mod p, where
iU
 
1
*
1 1 1|| ( )ii i k iz k z−− − −=  
)pw
1
*
1 1 1|| ( )ii i k iz k z++ + +=  
1 ( , 1, )ik S i p− = − 
1 1
Lz R= 11 2
xRz z=
w 1 ( , 1,ik S i+ = +
1 q
1U
R G∈
L
nz
. computes left key mod p, right key 1 mod p. 
computes left key mod p, right key , where
iU (1 )i n＜＜
R
n nz R=
1
i
iz −
xL
iz =
n
ixR
i iz z +=
nU 1n
x
n z −= R G∈ . Then each player computes 
and broadcasts
iU (1 )i n≤ ≤
L R
i i ziX z= mod p. Notes that 1R Li iz z += .
Step4. Each player computes mod p exactly using the same approach in the Step3 
of Horng’s protocol then computes
iU 1 2 2 3 1n n
x x x x x x
iK g −
− + + +
≡
K
( , )i isk S K=  
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